 |
|
 |
 |

|
BTI 2008
|
|
|
Malaysia Country Report
|
|
|
|
|
|
Status Index
|
1-10
|
6.36
|
# 42 of 125
|
|
|
|
|
Democracy
|
1-10
|
5.33
|
# 74 of 125
|

|
|
|
|
Market Economy
|
1-10
|
7.39
|
# 21 of 125
|

|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
Management Index
|
1-10
|
5.52
|
# 49 of 125
|
|
|
|
|
scale: 1 (lowest) to 10 (highest)
|
score
|
rank
|
trend
|
|
|
|
|
|
Please cite as follows: Bertelsmann Stiftung,
BTI 2008 — Malaysia
Country Report. Gütersloh: Bertelsmann Stiftung,
2007.
© 2007 Bertelsmann Stiftung, Gütersloh
|
|
Key Indicators
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
Population
|
mn.
|
25.3
|
|
HDI
|
0.81
|
|
GDP p.c.
|
$
|
9,681
|
|
Pop. growth1
|
% p.a.
|
1.8
|
|
HDI rank of 177
|
61
|
|
Gini Index
|
|
49.2
|
|
Life expectancy
|
years
|
74
|
|
UN Education Index
|
0.84
|
|
Poverty3
|
%
|
9.3
|
|
Urban population
|
%
|
67.3
|
|
Gender equality2
|
0.50
|
|
Aid per capita
|
$
|
1.2
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
Sources: UNDP, Human Development Report 2006 | The World Bank,
World Development Indicators 2007 | OECD Development Assistance Committee
2006. Footnotes: (1) Average annual growth rate 1990-2005. (2) Gender
Empowerment Measure (GEM). (3) Percentage of population living on less than
$2 a day.
|
|
|
Executive Summary
|
|
|
Malaysia has made progress in expanding
the scope of its market economy during the period under review. There is a
high degree of stateness, an absence of
undemocratic veto powers and institutions are stable. The institutional
foundation of the market economy, such as the basic rules of organization, is
firmly in place and the levels of socioeconomic development are high.
Currency, prices and economic growth are stable. Economic development is
based on a fairly well-developed education system, and is sustainable for
some time to come. Property rights are well defined, and high growth rates
have compensated for a lack of a welfare system.
However, political reforms toward liberal
democracy are still insufficient, which are primarily related to problems
inherent to Malaysia’s political structure, as well as dynamics driven by
ethno-religious tensions. Having maintained their own religions, cultures and
languages, Malaysia’s three major ethnic groups – Malays, Chinese and Indians
– have strongly resisted any moves that might blur these boundaries. With
political parties and mobilization based along ethnic and religious lines,
there are increasing tensions between the Muslim majority and non-Muslim
minority. These divisions also result in an absence of consensus on all key
issues. In addition to ethno-religious tensions, corruption and
fundamentalist Islam pose serious threats to state institutions and the
secular government. Thus far, there is a low level of political violence and
extremism.
Despite all these problems, there is
remarkable political stability, which is in large part due to the ruling Barisan Nasional (National
Front, BN) coalition, which has been in power since independence. The BNhas been consistent and pragmatic in its approach to
economic policies during its long tenure, giving Malaysia one of the highest
growth rates in the region. Poverty rates were more than halved during the
past two decades, and the biggest current problem appears to be the widening
gap between the rich and poor. Although the country was hurt by the Asian
financial crisis of 1997 – 1998, it has successfully recovered. From 1970 to
2003, Malaysia has shown consistent economic growth in GDP, averaging an
annual rate of about 7%. The standard of living for the majority of the
population improved significantly from 1970 to 2000, with the level of GDP
per capita increasing fourfold.
|
|
|
History and Characteristics of Transformation
|
|
|
The federation of Malaysia was
established in 1963 with the territories of Malaya, Singapore, Sabah and Sarawak. Two years later, in 1965, Singapore
was expelled from the federation. Today, Malaysia consists of 13 states and
two federal territories. It is a constitutional monarchy based on the British
Westminster model, a legacy of British colonialism. At the federal level,
there is a bicameral legislature. The House of Representatives (lower house)
is composed of members elected every five years in a first-past-the-post
election from single-member constituencies. Senate (upper house) members are
all appointed by the king. Executive power lies with the prime minister and
the cabinet. Each of the 13 states has its own legislature.
Politically and officially, the country’s
population is divided into two categories: Bumiputera
and non-Bumiputera. The Bumiputera
group consist of Malays and other indigenous peoples, while the non-Bumiputera group consists mainly of Chinese and Indians.
This divide is evident in every facet of Malaysian life, from politics to
food to university admissions.
Most of the Chinese and Indians first
came to Malaysia during colonial times when the British actively recruited
them to open up the economy. When the country gained independence, the British
left political power largely in the hands of the indigenous Malays. The Malay
leaders then forged a political alliance with the major Chinese and Indian
parties. This set a pattern for politics in which it became an unwritten law
that the prime minister position will always be held by a
Malay, specifically from the United Malays National Organisation
(UMNO). The current president of UMNO, Abdullah Ahmad Badawi,
is Malaysia’s fifth prime minister. The alliance system collapsed in May 1969
when race riots broke out between the Malays and the Chinese after a bitterly
fought election. The whole country was placed under emergency rule and the
constitution suspended. When the suspension was finally lifted in 1971, new
laws were passed to ensure Malay political supremacy. The UMNO became
all-powerful and aggressively promoted the Malay population, who were its
main supporters. A New Economic Policy (NEP) was promulgated, providing
extensive benefits to the Bumiputera (i.e., Malay)
community through quotas, bank loans, scholarships, special licenses, etc.
The government justified the affirmative action character of the NEP on the
basis that the economic gap between the Malay and the non-Malay (i.e.,
Chinese) was so wide that it threatened racial harmony and had prompted the
May 1969 riots. Although the NEP discriminated against the non-Bumiputera, the UMNO-led government was careful to allow
a free market economy to develop. The government gave the non-Bumiputera a free hand in the economy, as long as quotas
and shares were allocated for Malays. This strategy, which emphasized growth
with ethnic distribution through significant foreign direct investment in the
1970s and 1980s, was so successful that Malaysia became one of the “Asian
Tiger” economies.
Although the NEP officially ended in
1991, economic policies since then have retained the core character of their
predecessors, including special rights for the Bumiputera
and the promotion of rapid economic growth to ensure that all ethnic groups
receive their share of the economic pie.
Since independence, the government has
been headed up by the UMNO and the ruling coalition, Barisan
Nasional (National Front, BN), has won every
general election. The BN regularly gets more than two-thirds majority in
parliament, allowing it to amend the constitution at will, and gave the
executive the leeway to pursue policies without opposition. Having
successfully managed the economy, the government has been able to proclaim
that, by 2020, Malaysia will be a fully developed and industrialized country.
Today, Malaysia is generally regarded as a success story among developing
countries by maintaining a stable and growing economy and a relatively stable
polity, despite ethno-religious conflicts.
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
Transformation Status
|
|
|
|
|
I. Democracy
|
|
|
|
|
Democratic transformation in Malaysia
stagnated during the review process. During the past two years (2005 – 2006),
key shortcomings have persisted, particularly regarding the electoral
process, free media, political representation, rule of law, the effective and
efficient democratic institutions, and consensus-building. Malaysia has never
been a fully democratic or fully authoritarian country. Elements of both
democracy and authoritarianism can be found. The country’s diversity
guarantees that full-fledged liberal democratic development will be difficult
to achieve. Since independence, the government has sought to concentrate on
economic development rather than political development, believing that once
Malaysia is fully industrialized and developed, many
contentious issues can more easily be resolved. One negative development
during the review period is the increasing radicalism of the Islamic movement
in Malaysia. Many of these groups seek the imposition of Islamic law in
Malaysia and openly call for the death penalty for those who wish to convert
from Islam to another religion. Many of these groups also oppose inter-faith
dialogues and regard Islam as superior to all other religions. In one
disturbing incident in 2006, more than ten thousand angry Muslims surrounded
a Catholic church when rumors circulated that there
was a baptism ceremony for Muslims planning to become Catholics. It was later
revealed that one of the individuals spreading the rumor
was the state mufti, the highest Islamic authority in the state. In a more
positive development, NGOs have mushroomed during the period under review,
many of which promote democracy, human and women’s rights, the environment
and inter-faith harmony. Making good use of easy Internet access, these
groups have organized and publicized their actions and goals through the web,
and have recruited new members. Many of these NGOs are now learning to work
with political parties to create new forums for democratic debate. Arguing
that almost all of these groups are critical of government policies, the
government is unwilling to engage civil society groups, which slows the
development of civil society. Media freedoms in Malaysia are underdeveloped.
According to Reporters Without Borders, Malaysia ranks at 92nd out of 168 countries
in its worldwide press freedom index.
|
|
|
|
|
1 | Stateness
|
|
|
|
|
Citizenship and the state’s monopoly on
the use of force are undisputed. The Malaysian state is strong and sovereign.
Although there are territorial disputes with the Philippines (the state of Sabah) and Singapore, these are not deemed important by
the polity and do not interfere with the workings of the state.
|
|
Monopoly on
the use of force
|
|
|
The key political institutions of the
state, such as the bureaucracy, armed forces, parliament and monarchy, are
all dominated by ethnic Malays, ensuring that the state has a strong Malay
contingent.
|
|
State
identity
|
|
|
Although the country is constitutionally
secular, political Islam plays an increasingly important role in public
policy as the state tries to negotiate between a small but vocal band of
fundamentalist Islamists and the secular majority. Parti
Islam Malaysia (PAS), one of the two main opposition parties, advocates the
creation of a theocratic Islamic state. In 2002, former Premier Mahathir Mohamad called
Malaysia an Islamic country, but he did not alter the secular constitution. Mahathir claimed that because 60% of Malaysia’s
population are classified as Muslims, Malaysia is a de facto Islamic state.
The current Badawi administration has also adopted
a similar stand.
|
|
No
interference of religious dogmas
|
|
|
The state’s basic administration is
sophisticated and sound. There are clear lines of divsions
between government departments and agencies, and the administrative is, on
the whole, capable, professional and well-trained. The administration follows
the orders of the elected government.
|
|
Basic
administration
|
|
|
2 | Political Participation
|
|
|
|
|
Malaysia has established universal
suffrage and more than half of registered voters regularly take part in
elections. Elections have been held on schedule (every five years) since
independence. Elections in Malaysia cannot be considered free and fair. The
ruling BN has never lost a general election since independence,
and most analysts would attribute their excellent record of winning elections
to a mixture of using repressive laws to restrict the opposition,
gerrymandering, media control, and using government resources to ensure
consistent victories.
|
|
Free and
fair elections
|
|
|
Elected rulers have the power to rule,
but the country’s ethnicized politics allow groups
promoting Malay political dominance and greater Islamization
to lobby successfully against the state to change policies. For example,
although there is widespread unhappiness with the NEP’s
racial discrimatory policies, the elected rulers
refused to change this policy as it benefits the Malay population.
|
|
Effective
power to govern
|
|
|
Although there are signs of increasing
political activism among NGOs and civil society groups, there are many laws
that restrict their growth and development. For example, Amnesty
International has been denied permission to establish a branch in Malaysia, despite
several applications. The same laws are used to restrict the growth of trade
unions or other independent enclaves of political activity.
|
|
Association
/ assembly rights
|
|
|
Freedoms of information, speech and
assembly are all restricted by law. The only area where the law has not
caught up is the Internet, where all forms of political expression are
grudgingly tolerated. However, in early 2007, individuals close to the ruling
BN began defamation suits against political bloggers
who were critical of government policies. These legal suits are meant as a
warning to others.
|
|
Freedom of
expression
|
|
|
3 | Rule of Law
|
|
|
|
|
Rule of law is generally respected in
Malaysia, as long as it does not interfere with the government’s political
agenda. The government can change the law at will because the ruling BN has a
two-thirds majority in parliament, allowing it to amend the constitution at
any time. During Mahathir Mohammad’s administration
(1981 – 2003), the federal constitution was amended almost annually.
|
|
Separation
of powers
|
|
|
The judiciary came under assault
from the executive, resulting in the forced removal of the chief justice and
two Supreme Court justices in 1998. The Badawi
administration has tried to restore confidence by adopting a more professional
approach to the appointment of judges, but the consensus is that it will take
years for the Malaysian judiciary to regain its reputation as an independent
check on the executive. A black spot on the judiciary, the jailing of Anwar Ibrahim, was somewhat mitigated
when he was released by an appeals court in September 2004. A few years
earlier, a senior judge wrote a letter detailing corruption at the highest
level of the judiciary. The charges were never properly investigated and the
judge quietly retired, leading to speculation that a cover-up took place.
|
|
Independent
judiciary
|
|
|
Corruption is a key threat to the rule of
law. Although there is no accurate measure of corruption in Malaysia, there
is a widespread perception that corruption is common among the nation’s
political and business elite, whose close ties form what is often referred to
as “money politics.” Transparency International’s 2006 Corruption Perception
Index ranked Malaysia at 44th, down from 37th in 2003. Government policies
that award huge infrastructure projects to selected Malay businesses without
an open bidding process and grant special licenses to the same group have
encouraged corruption. Although Prime Minister Badawi
pledged to eliminate corruption in the 2004 general elections, little has
been done since. At the lower level, corruption is dealt with effectively by
the Anti-Corruption Agency (ACA). The general view is that there is a
different set of rules for the “big fish” and the “small fish” when it comes
to corruption. In 2004, the government launched the National Integrity Plan
with anti-corruption as one of its key platforms; however, many people are
disappointed that no major political figure has been removed or arrested for
corruption in the past two years. The general consensus is that there is
little political will to tackle corruption at the higher levels. Tolerance of
selected corruption continues primarily because the UMNO uses its power to
buy its supporters. Major government contracts are almost always awarded to
Malay companies and Malay individuals with close ties to UMNO; thus, any
action against this group would cause a split within UMNO and may even
threaten the position of Badawi, who is the
president of UMNO.
|
|
Prosecution
of office abuse
|
|
|
There are laws restricting political
participation, free expression and civil liberties. The most infamous one is
the Internal Security Act (ISA), which allows for indefinite detention
without judicial redress. Opponents of the government have been held under
the ISA. The Official Secrets Act (OSA) automatically classifies all
government documents as “secret,” thereby denying the media and the public
access.
The police are held in low esteem by
the public. A Royal Commission report in 2005 found widespread corruption in
the police, routine police torture and little respect for human rights. Its
key recommendation, the establishment of an independent police commission to
oversee the police force, has not been adopted by the government despite
widespread public support. The Human Rights Commission, established in 1999,
has tried to deal with issues relating to police abuses and abuse of power by
the bureaucracy. However, it has been ineffective, given that its
recommendations are routinely ignored by the government.
The role of Islam in civil cases has
been increasing for several years. Islam is the official religion in Malaysia
and all Malays are constitutionally defined as Muslims. There is no provision
for conversions from Islam. There is, however, a law stipulating mandatory conversion
to Islam for the non-Muslim partner in marriage to a Muslim, which has
resulted in a great number of converts in Malaysia. Others convert to Islam
without telling their family members.
During the period under review,
there have been four high-profile cases in which Islamic authorities have
forcibly taken the bodies of recently deceased individuals from their
immediate family. The authorities claimed that the deceased was a convert and
that they needed to give him an Islamic burial. This is often fervently
disputed by the family, who are all non-Muslims. In all these cases, the
non-Muslim families are asked to appear before the Shari’ah
court to determine the religion of the deceased. This is unacceptable to the
family, since appearing before the Shari’ah court
implies that they recognize the Islamic court’s jurisdiction. This occurs
despite the fact that the law clearly states that the Shari’ah
court can only deal with Muslims. Another controversial case involved an
Indian man who secretly converted his children to Islam without the knowledge
of his Hindu wife. He did this to ensure that he would get custody of the
children during the divorce; under Shariah law,
Muslim children must live with Muslim adults. There have been many cases of
estranged husbands converting to Islam to escape from alimony payments or to
marry someone else without divorcing their first non-Muslim wife. The law
says that once a person is Muslim, the Shari’ah
court has jurisdiction, but makes no provisions for cases of Muslim
conversions where one partner retains their non-Muslim faith.
In early 2005, the Bar Council,
working with several secular NGOs, tried to establish an Inter-Faith
Commission to deal with issues arising out religious conflict. Several
fundamentalist Islamic groups threatened violence, and several Muslims who
supported the commission received death threats. Several Islamic NGOs have
called on the government to impose the death penalty on apostasy. In 2006,
the government said it will not support the commission and called on the
public not to discuss Islamic issues.
|
|
Civil
rights
|
|
|
4 | Stability of Democratic Institutions
|
|
|
|
|
Subject to the aforementioned
reservations about the problems of a working system of checks and balances,
key institutions are stable. The government is strong and in control. As long
as there is the political will, things happen and work gets done. The only
concern here is the omnipresence of the political executive. The prime minister
and the cabinet make all key decisions with little regard for the wishes of
parliament or the public. For the most part, parliament acts like a rubber
stamp in the approval of executive decisions.
|
|
Performance
of democratic institutions
|
|
|
Despite the dominance of the UMNO in
government and the marginalization of non-Malays, the system is remarkably
stable, as the smooth transfer of power from Mahathir
to Badawi in 2003 shows. Key institutions, such as
the armed forces, police, bureaucracy and the judiciary, are largely accepted
by the polity as legitimate, although non-Malays view them as attentive only
to the interests of the Malay community.
|
|
Commitment
to democratic institutions
|
|
|
5 | Political and Social Integration
|
|
|
|
|
Taken as a whole, the Malaysian party
system is remarkably stable in view of ethno-religious tensions. This
stability comes from two sources. It comes first from the ruling coalition
BN, which is comprised of 14 parties, each representing an ethnic group or a
region. Although the UMNO dominates the BN, other coalition parties are
allowed to champion their ethnic agendas, and concessions are made to
preserve the working of the coalition. Thus, while the UMNO has more power
proportionately, others do get a minor share, thus ensuring that political
stability is preserved. Second, opposition parties are also similarly divided
along racial lines, ensuring that all mainstream political parties mobilize
along ethnic lines. This indirectly forces the leaders of these ethnically
based parties to seek compromises among themselves in order to ensure social
stability. This elite bargaining allows most sensitive issues to be resolved.
The only area of concern is the strong push by the opposition Parti Islam Malaysia (PAS) to establish a theocratic
Islamic state. If this happens, some 40% of the population who are non-Muslim
would immediately be disenfranchised from the political system. Thus far, the
votes have shown a clear preference for secular parties. The state-defined
and state-enforced social divide between the Bumiputera
(Malay) and the non-Bumiputera remains the
cornerstone of ethnic relations in Malaysia. As long as the state
discriminates in favor of the Bumiputera,
there will be strong resentment among the non-Bumiputera.
The level of resentment will depend heavily on economic performance; ethnic
tensions tend to be lowest during periods of high growth, given that all have
a share in the expanding economic pie. In the medium to long term, however,
the country will be divided not into Bumiputera or
non-Bumiputera, but rather between Muslim and
non-Muslim. Combined with the ethnic divide, this may lead to political
instability.
|
|
Party
system
|
|
|
Largely
because political parties mobilize along lines of race and religion, the
majority of interest groups in Malaysia are focused on both. Political
conflicts, even over neutral issues such as education standards, are also
seen as ethnic issues. Opposition parties are systematically disadvantaged,
and civic groups can act only within the narrow limits set by the authorities
and as long as they don’t touch on “racial” issues or become outspokenly
critical of the government.
|
|
Interest groups
|
|
|
There is
no reliable survey data available on democratic political attitudes among the
citizens of Malaysia. Anecdotal evidence, voter support for reform-oriented
pro-democratic political parties, as well as occasional political protests, indicate that there is a pro-democratic sentiment among
some segments of the populace. Most observers contend that most citizens and
voters, as well as the majority of the political elite, support Malaysia’s
“semi-democratic” political status.
|
|
Consent to democratic norms
|
|
|
Self-organization
in civil society and nonpolitical associations encounter political and
cultural obstacles. Malaysia’s semi-democratic political order limits
associational life, the stock of social capital is weak, and the country
lacks traditions of civic sociability. There are cultural barriers between
the major ethnic and religious groups and social and cultural life among
Muslim-Malays, Chinese, and Indians reflects a segmented autonomy. While
there is, of course, some self-organization, it is very unevenly distributed
among the population, and inter-communal relations are characterized by
relatively low levels of inter-ethnic trust.
|
|
Associational activities
|
|
|
II. Market Economy
|
|
|
|
|
In stark contrast to his predecessor Mahthir, who pushed for mega projects such as the world’s
tallest building, a new capital city and a national car project, when
Abdullah Badawi took over as prime minister on 31
October 2003, he announced s a return to basics concerning the economy. Badawi revamped government-linked companies (GLCs) such as Telekom, Tenaga Nasional (national power
corporation) and Malaysian Airlines, and new executives were appointed to
these GLCs, including a new chief executive for Khazanah Nasional, the
government’s investment holding company. Temasek
Holdings, the investment arm of the Singapore government, was allowed to buy
significant stakes in GLCs and a bank. Badawi also broke with tradition by appointing a
professional to be finance minister. Badawi’s
“Ninth Malaysia Plan” (five-year economic plan) places major emphasis on
agriculture and human resources development. The markets generally approved
these economic reforms.
|
|
|
|
|
6 | Level of Socioeconomic Development
|
|
|
|
|
Key indicators show a medium level of
development. Among the group of transformation countries in Asia and Oceania,
Malaysia ranks at 61st in the 2006 UNDP’s HDI. The
country’s level of socioeconomic development permits adequate freedom of
choice for all citizens, subject to affirmative actions by the state in favor of the Bumiputera.
Muslims cannot legally leave the religion. There is no fundamental social
exclusion because of poverty, unequal access to education or deep gender
discrimination, although the state actively maintains a quota for the Bumiputera in professional occupations, education and
business. This has lead to the exclusion of the non-Bumiputera
at the lower level of society, although high growth in the past decade has
ensured that even the most marginalized groups have benefited somewhat.
Poverty rates have come down across the board, and it is generally
acknowledged that poverty reduction programs in Malaysia are one of the most
successful in the Asia-Pacific region. Nevertheless, problems remain. Throughout
the review period, the single biggest problem has been the growing inequality
between the rich and poor. According to the UNDP, in 1990, households in the
lowest 40% of income earners only received around 14% of total income.
|
|
Socioeconomic
barriers
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
Economic indicators
|
|
2002
|
2003
|
2004
|
2005
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
GDP
|
$ mn.
|
95,164
|
103,992
|
118,461
|
130,326
|
|
Growth of GDP
|
%
|
4.1
|
5.7
|
7.2
|
5.2
|
|
Inflation (CPI)
|
%
|
1.8
|
1.1
|
1.5
|
3
|
|
Unemployment
|
%
|
3.5
|
3.6
|
3.5
|
-
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
Foreign direct investment
|
% of GDP
|
3.4
|
2.4
|
3.9
|
3.0
|
|
Export growth
|
%
|
4.5
|
5.7
|
16.3
|
8.6
|
|
Import growth
|
%
|
6.3
|
4.2
|
20.7
|
8
|
|
Current account balance
|
$ mn.
|
7189.7
|
13,381.2
|
14871.5
|
19,979.9
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
Public debt
|
$ mn.
|
26,414.7
|
25,399.6
|
25,570.3
|
22,449.3
|
|
External debt
|
$ mn.
|
48,272.1
|
48,557.0
|
52,155.6
|
50,980.7
|
|
External debt service
|
% of GNI
|
9
|
9.8
|
8.2
|
7.6
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
Cash surplus or deficit
|
% of GDP
|
-6.3
|
-4.3
|
-
|
-
|
|
Tax Revenue
|
% of GDP
|
18.8
|
17.6
|
-
|
-
|
|
Government consumption
|
% of GDP
|
13.8
|
13.9
|
13.2
|
12.9
|
|
Public expnd. on edu.
|
% of GDP
|
8.1
|
8.0
|
-
|
-
|
|
Public expnd. on
health
|
% of GDP
|
2.1
|
2.6
|
2.2
|
-
|
|
R&D expenditure
|
% of GDP
|
0.7
|
-
|
-
|
-
|
|
Military expenditure
|
% of GDP
|
2.4
|
2.8
|
2.3
|
2.4
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
Sources: The World Bank, World
Development Indicators 2007 | UNESCO Institute for Statistics | Stockholm
International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI), Yearbook: Armaments,
Disarmament and International Security
|
|
|
|
|
7 | Organization of the Market and Competition
|
|
|
|
|
Malaysia has an institutional
foundation for a competitive market-based economy firmly in place. However,
in practice, this is not applied in cases involving individuals with
high-level political access. The open bidding system is not used for key
government contracts, since the government pursues a policy of ensuring Bumiputera equity, while all smaller government contracts
are only open to Bumiputera companies. National
interest ensures that state-owned enterprises such as Proton, the national
auto manufacturer, are heavily protected by tax rebates and excise duties.
Most public utilities cannot raise prices without government permission. One
area of concern is red tape. The World Bank, in its 2006 annual business
report, saw Malaysia’s standings drop in several areas compared to 2005,
namely in dealing with licenses, employing workers, trading across borders,
enforcing contracts and closing businesses. To start a business in Malaysia,
entrepreneurs may have to go through nine steps – compared to the 8.2 steps
taken on the average in the region – and 30 days of paperwork on average. The
steps, time and cost of complying with licensing and permit requirements for
ongoing operations is a staggering 281 steps at a cost of 78.19% of income
per capita, compared to the region’s average of only 17.6 steps. As for
property, it takes about 144 days to register a property in Malaysia,
compared to only 85.8 days on average in the region. It takes about 31 steps
and 450 days to enforce commercial contracts in Malaysia. The time and cost
required to resolve bankruptcies in Malaysia takes 2.25 years and costs about
14.50% of the estate value. The recovery rate, expressed in terms of how many
cents on the dollar claimants recover from the insolvent firm, is 38.69.
Malaysia scored higher against the region in terms of investor protection,
which includes transparency of transactions, liability for inside trading,
shareholders’ ability to sue officers and directors for misconduct, and the
Strength of Investor Protection Index.
|
|
Market-based
competition
|
|
|
At present, there is no law against
monopolies, although there are no monopolies like South Korea’s chaebols. However, there are several oligopolies built by
Chinese companies or public-private (Malay) enterprises.
|
|
Anti-monopoly
policy
|
|
|
In 2005, the government made a
significant move to liberalize the capital markets when it issued full
licenses to selected foreign brokerage firms. In 2006, the government relaxed
regulations relating to property investments by foreign interests. Foreigners
do not need permission anymore for properties priced above MYR 250,000
($70,000). In early 2007, the Kuala Lumpur Stock Exchange reintroduced “short
selling” on the floor and removed all restrictions on money moving in and out
of Malaysia. Competition will intensify in the coming years as Malaysia
implements free trade agreements with countries such as the United States,
Singapore and Australia. The ASEAN Free Trade Area (AFTA) will also go into
effect in 2008, leading to even fiercer competition.
|
|
Liberalization
of foreign trade
|
|
|
The banking system was consolidated
during the review period. This process has been driven by the central bank as
it prepares the local banking industry for competition; Malaysia has to open
up its financial markets in line with WTO requirements. The government’s plan
is to consolidate the 36 financial institutions into six “anchor” banks, all
supposedly with adequate capital to compete, at least in the region. There is
agreement, however, that Malaysian financial institutions cannot hope to
compete globally, and that further rationalization may be needed.
|
|
Banking
system
|
|
|
8 | Currency and Price Stability
|
|
|
|
|
For the period under review, the
Malaysian government has successfully pursued a sound macroeconomic policy.
Inflation has been low, around 3.1% in 2005. In 2005, the government removed
the ringgit peg to the U.S. dollar, which was
introduced during the Asian Financial Crisis in 1998. It has opted for the
“managed float” system of currency exchange, allowing the ringgit
to appreciate slowly. The ringgit has risen by
about 9% against the U.S. dollar since 2005 and is expected to appreciate
further in 2007.
|
|
Anti-inflation
/ forex policy
|
|
|
Generally, the Malaysian government
follows a consistent policy for stability, notwithstanding inconsistencies of
institutional safeguards and a remaining risk of populist policies. Federal
government revenue registered at 11.4% from 2000 to 2005. The increase was
attributed to higher revenue collected form petroleum taxes and export
duties, as well as returns on investments. The federal government’s operating
expenditure expanded at an average annual rate of 11.6% from 2000 to 2005.
Taking into account development expenditures, the overall federal government
fiscal deficit declined from 5.7% of GDP in 2000 to 3.8% of GDP in 2005.
Outstanding debt increased to 46.2% to GDP in 2005 (86.9% of the total being
domestic debt). Macroeconomic management for the Ninth Economic Development
Plan (2006 – 2010) focuses on maintaining the macroeconomic stability to
consolidate the economy on a sustainable growth path for the achievement of
distributional goals as well as improvement in the population’s quality of
life.
|
|
Macrostability
|
|
|
9 | Private Property
|
|
|
|
|
There are no problems with property
ownership rights and the regulation of property acquisition. The economy is
overwhelmingly based on private ownership. Nevertheless, the government is a
key player in the economy by virtue of being the major shareholder of major
utilities companies, such as those dealing with construction, power,
telecommunications and transport.
|
|
Property
rights
|
|
|
More than 35% of the market
capitalization in the Kuala Lumpur Stock Exchange is owned by
government-linked companies. The government is officially committed to the
privatization of as many government assets as possible. The only controversy
is that these assets will only be privatized to Malay interests.
|
|
Private enterprise
|
|
|
10 | Welfare Regime
|
|
|
|
|
There is no state-sponsored social
welfare system in Malaysia. Rather, all employees and employers must
contribute to a provident fund that can be withdrawn upon retirement. The
current rate of contribution is 23% of annual salary. There are some
government-run homes but these are mostly for the destitute. The family
remains the core defense against social risk. The
government has invested heavily in providing basic medical care for all at a
nominal cost, while specialist care is available at public hospitals at a
heavily subsidized price.
|
|
Social
safety nets
|
|
|
There are a number of institutions to
compensate for gross social differences. The government continues to follow a
distinct affirmative action policy for Malay-Muslims and other “sons of the
soil,” including economic redistribution through economic growth, as well as
improvement in the quality of life of the population. However, women do not
have equal access to education and public services. Chinese and Indians are
deliberately disadvantaged in public office in the state bureaucracy, public
enterprises and the armed forces.
|
|
Equal
opportunity
|
|
|
11 | Economic Performance
|
|
|
|
|
GDP growth has been relatively strong in
Malaysia for the period under review. GDP growth was 5.3% in 2003, 7% in 2004
and around 6% in 2005. The budget deficit has come down to less than 5% in
the review period. As an export-oriented economy, Malaysia’s economic
performance is tied very much to the global economy. If there is a global
slowdown, it will affect Malaysia immediately. Although the official
unemployment rate is about 3.6% in 2006, in reality there is full employment.
There are currently close to 1.5 million foreign workers (mostly Indonesians,
Filipinos and others from the Indian subcontinent) in the country.
|
|
Output
strength
|
|
|
12 | Sustainability
|
|
|
|
|
Environmental concerns have grown in
recent years among citizens, lawmakers and the government. However, the
overriding objective of the government is economic growth; environmental
lobbies have never won a major battle against a key development project. One
example is the Bakun hydroelectric dam project;
despite overwhelming objections from international and Malaysian
environmental NGOs, the government is adamant about seeing this project
through. The Bakun dam project envisages the
creation of a lake about the size of Singapore.
|
|
Environmental
policy
|
|
|
Malaysia has a comprehensive education
system and a modern infrastructure, and continues to invest heavily in
education, especially in science and engineering. Unfortunately, quality
issues have emerged regarding public universities, as the quality of local
academic staff and local graduates is deemed low by international standards.
Many academic staff and students lack basic skills such as English language
abilities. Despite this, in 2007, the government announced the establishment
of three new public universities, bringing the total number of public
universities to 19. Starting in the 1990s, the government liberalized
tertiary education, encouraging foreign institutions to establish campuses in
Malaysia and allowing private tertiary institutions to compete with public
universities. In the past decade, four foreign universities have built branch
campuses: Nottingham University (UK), Monash
University (Australia), Swinburne University of
Technology (Australia) and Curtin University of Technology (Australia). The
government is also actively encouraging foreign students to study in
Malaysia. Malaysia has also tried to establish itself as a major information
and communications technologies (ICT) hub. The previous Mahathir
administration established a Multi-Media Super Corridor (MSC) to attract
international collaboration in investment in ICT. However, these efforts have
not been successful. In 2006, the Badawi
administration announced a multi-billion ringgit
plan to turn the entire southern tip of the country, facing Singapore, into a
massive industrial zone. The Iskandar Development
Region will take ten years to complete and entails an investment of MYR 47
billion ($13.5 billion). A further MYR 3.5 billion will be spent on the
northern corridor, including a new bridge linking Penang
Island to the mainland, and upgrading the existing airports. Despite all of
these moves, Malaysia is still weak in research and development. From 2006 to
2007, Malaysia was ranked at 26th in the World Economic Forum’s Growth
Competitiveness Index. The stated aim of the government is to make Malaysia a
fully industrialized country by 2020.
|
|
Education
policy / R&D
|
|
Transformation Management
|
|
|
|
|
I. Level of Difficulty
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
Measured
in terms of national poverty levels, educational levels, geographic location,
degree of infrastructural development, health status of the population and
geographic location, the structural constraints on governance are moderate in
Malaysia.
|
|
Structural constraints
|
|
|
Notwithstanding socioeconomic
modernization and the slow but steady growth of civil society in Malaysia,
traditions of civil society are still weak. However, since the 1990s, there
has been a moderate increase in associational vitality.
|
|
Civil
society traditions
|
|
|
Throughout the review period, there
appear to have been three constraints on governance. First, the ruling
coalition under BN is constrained by the ethnic equation. Although the UMNO
dominates the coalition, it cannot ignore the interests of other coalition
members who represent other ethnic groups, two of which (Chinese and Indian)
collectively make up more than one-third of the population. Second, there is
an increasing trend towards “Islamicization,” which
makes it difficult for the BN to pursue more liberal policies that offend
Islamic sensitivities. A simple example is that the government cannot build
casinos as tourist attractions. Nonetheless, the BN has made remarkable
progress and has managed to keep the country on a secular path. Third, there
is pressure on the government to provide more opportunities and subsidies to
the Bumiputera population, in addition to existing
affirmative action programs and quotas. This has created tensions among
non-Malays, who feel that they have already suffered enough discrimination.
Many fear that more affirmative action policies will simply make Malaysia
uncompetitive and scare away foreign investors. The World Bank’s latest
Worldwide Governance Indicators 2006 report showed Malaysia fared worse than
10 years ago in five of the six good governance indicators: voice and
accountability, political stability and absence of violence, government
effectiveness, regulatory quality, rule of law and
control of corruption.
|
|
Conflict
intensity
|
|
|
II. Management Performance
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
14 | Steering
Capability
|
|
|
|
|
Undoubtedly, the Malaysian government is
pursuing the long-term goal of economic growth and social development. It
seeks to build and preserve social consensus about a specifically Malaysian
form of capitalism (i.e., “ethnicized” market
development). However, its strategic aims are not commensurate with the aim
to strengthen liberal democracy; rather, the political leadership attempts to
preserve the semi-democratic status of the political order.
|
|
Prioritization
|
|
|
The government’s steering capability is
high. Because it has been in power since independence, it has near total
control of all the state institutions. Policies, especially economic
policies, are drawn up in a fairly rational manner and implemented
effectively as long as they are in line with government priorities.
|
|
Implementation
|
|
|
Reviews and reforms of policies are
done regularly, although these are often prone to political interference. The
government’s aim and objectives are widely published and understood by the
professional community. The only area of concern is the reluctance of the
ruling elite to get rid of institutional discrimination policies against
non-Malays, widen democracy, liberalize politically and commit to a secular
state. There is, however, no reluctance to reform the economy or to adopt new
economic policies, as long as these policies do not interfere with
affirmative action policies.
|
|
Policy
learning
|
|
|
15 | Resource Efficiency
|
|
|
|
|
The government makes fairly efficient use
of available economic and human resources for its economic and social
policies. Reforms of the financial markets, banking sector and corporate
sector have largely been adequately planned and effectively implemented. The
only area of inefficiency is the government affirmative action policy, which
requires it to set aside a Bumiputera quota for all
of its economic activities. The government bureaucracy is relatively
professional, although politics have ensured that it is almost totally
dominated by Malays. At the middle and lower levels of the bureaucracy, there
are efficiency issues, since the government is often forced to absorb
poor-quality graduates. These graduates, all Bumiputeras,
were given places in universities under the quota system and political
necessity requires the government and government-linked companies to offer
them employment since they cannot get a job in the performance-driven private
sector.
|
|
Efficient
use of assets
|
|
|
The government regularly consults experts
and takes input from the private sector when it draws up the budget and
economic policies. Major conflicts over economic or social policies are
effectively dealt with at the cabinet level.
|
|
Policy
coordination
|
|
|
Corruption in the civil service is
probably the lowest in the region after Singapore, although many people
believe that rent-seeking behavior is worsening
among the political elite. Those awarded public infrastructure projects and
privatization exercises are linked directly to the ruling BN; political
connection is the most important criterion in awarding large contracts. There
is also concern over the government’s continued indirect subsidies for ”national” projects such as the national automaker,
Proton. Many of these projects were initiated under the previous Mahathir administration. The Badawi
administration has set lower tariffs for imported cars, and Proton has been
told that it will have its subsidies cut in the next few years.
|
|
Anti-corruption
policy
|
|
|
16 | Consensus-Building
|
|
|
|
|
All major political and social
actors, with the exception of the fundamentalist Islamists, agree on the goal
of a market-based economy. There is no politically relevant actor who can
derail either the reform process or the expansion of the market economy. On
liberal democracy, however, there is no consensus. Due to ethnic, cultural
and religious diversity, different groups have diverse ideas about democracy.
The official government stand is that liberal democracy as practiced by the
West is unsuitable for a pluralist country like Malaysia. It is of the
opinion that Western-style democracy will lead to chaos, as seen in the race
riots of 1969.
|
|
Consensus
on goals
|
|
|
Fundamentalist Islamists in Malaysia
reject democracy categorically and want Malaysia to be a theocratic state.
They see moves to strengthen Western-style democracy as un-Islamic. Racial
and religious identification is so strong that moves to promote consensus,
such as Bangsa Malaysia (Malaysian race), are met
with strong resistance by various ethnic groups who see it as an attempt to
“dilute” their culture, language and religion.
|
|
Anti-democratic
veto actors
|
|
|
Given the strong degree of ethnic and
religious heterogeneity, ethno-religious cleavages in addition to economic
and ideological cleavages are clearly significant. While the political
leadership follows a policy of national integration and reconciliation, based
on the principles of affirmative action and segmented autonomy, this policy
prevents cleavage-based conflicts from escalating, rather than defusing them.
|
|
Cleavage /
conflict management
|
|
|
The political leadership only takes into
account and accommodates the interests of civil society actors as long as
they are not seen as interfering with the government policies. Where it feels
that civil society is acting “politically” or in a way that threatens the
interests of the ruling coalition or the government, civil society actors are
ignored. When there is a conflict between demands by civil society
organizations and government preferences, the political leadership tends to
formulate its policy autonomously.
|
|
Civil
society participation
|
|
|
There is little chance of reconciliation
given that the ethnic and religious gulf between the Malay and Muslims
against the non-Malays and non-Muslims is widening daily. Malay political
leaders manipulate history to justify their Kekuatan
Melayu (Malay dominance) ideology. Bringing an end
to discriminatory NEP policies would be the first step toward reconciliation,
but Malay leaders have stated they have no intention of doing so.
|
|
Reconciliation
|
|
|
17 | International Cooperation
|
|
|
|
|
The political leadership cooperates
with bilateral and multilateral donors and international financial
institutions, and tries to make use of international assistance as long as
this seems to suit the government’s preferences. It does not facilitate
notable policy learning, nor does it promote strengthened democracy and civil
rights.
|
|
Effective
use of support
|
|
|
Malaysia
became a major player on the international scene when it simultaneously
assumed the administration of both the Organization of the Islamic Conference
(OIC) and the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM) in October 2003. It has taken a
strong stand against terrorism, against the war in Iraq, and against the
West’s failure to help developing countries. In terms of economics, it prides
itself as the only nation to reject IMF advice during the Asian financial
crisis. Instead, it pegged its currency, the ringgit
to the U.S. dollar. Nevertheless, the government remains fully engaged with
the World Bank, IMF, ADB and other international financial institutions.
|
|
Credibility
|
|
|
Malaysia
actively promotes “South-South” (Langkawi)
dialogues, which bring leaders of African countries to Malaysia to discuss
economic and trade cooperation. Despite Malaysia’s strong anti-Western stand
on key political issues, it has excellent international trading links. The
government has skillfully separated trade from political issues. ASEAN
remains the cornerstone of Malaysian foreign policy.
|
|
Regional cooperation
|
|
|
Strategic Outlook
|
|
|
Overall, economic transformation in Malaysia has progressed during
the period under review. The government has consistently pursued rational and
sound economic policies, and demonstrated its commitment to growth and
further liberalization of the market. However, there are persistent
institutional problems in democratic transformation. Ethnic and religious
tensions continue, and the government has difficulty in manag
While the majority of the Muslim population is moderate and progressive in
its outlook, there is an increasingly vocal minority that advocates
fundamentalist Islam, including the establishment of a theocratic state to
replace the present one. Some of these radical groups advocate violence to
achieve their aims. The government, backed by an efficient security
apparatus, has been able to thwart various attempts at violence, and many of
these groups now operate underground. These groups are not a threat to the
nation-state as long as they remain outside mainstream Islam. There are
encouraging signs that the main Islamic party, PAS, has rejected these
fundamentalist groups and is willing to play by the rules by winning power
through the ballot box. On the economic front, much remains to be done. More
efficiency is needed and priorities must be set in the services sector. The
financial sector, especially banking, needs to consolidate further. None of
the Malaysian banks have the capital or the expertise to compete against
foreign banks. The greatest challenge will be in the manufacturing sector,
since the ASEAN Free Trade Agreement will become a reality by the end of the
decade. The manufacturing sector cannot hope to compete with cheap labor countries such as Vietnam and Indonesia. Businesses
in this sector must move up the technological ladder, attract more foreign
investments and increase their competitive capacity. To advance reform and
improve Malaysia’s competitive capacity , the
government must bring an end to its Bumiputera
affirmative action policy, which encourages rent-seeking behavior
and impedes competition. The policy has also prevented improved ethnic
relations between the Bumiputera and non-Bumiputera, who feel discriminated against in all spheres
of life. If the government annuls this policy, there is every reason to
believe that the economy will be much more competitive, and more importantly,
it will strengthen national cohesion while unifying the citizenry.
The government must also tackle the increasing gap between the rich and poor.
The country’s Gini coefficient has worsened from
0.452 in 1999 to 0.462 in 2004. The income share of the bottom 40% of
households decreased from 14% in 1999 to 13.5% in 2004, while the income
share of the top 20% of households increased from 50.5% to 51.2%.
|

|
 |
 |




|
 |